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ABSTRACT
In everyday situations, people regularly receive information from large groups of
(lay) people and from single experts. Although lay opinions and expert opinions
have been studied extensively in isolation, the present study examined the
relationship between the two by asking how many laypeople are needed to
counter an expert opinion. A Bayesian formalisation allowed the prescription of
this quantity. Participants were subsequently asked to assess how many
laypeople are needed in different situations. The results demonstrate that
people are sensitive to the relevant factors identiﬁed for determining how many
lay opinions are required to counteract a single expert opinion. People’s
assessments were fairly good in line with Bayesian predictions.
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On 23 June 2016, the British electorate voted to leave the European Union –
so-called “Brexit”. This was despite the majority of political experts recom-
mending that the country remain in the European Union, exempliﬁed by
479 MPs declaring their support to remain in the European Union by 22 June,
whilst only 158 supported Brexit (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-
referendum-35616946). In contrast, the electorate voted to leave the
European Union by 17,410,742 votes to 16,141,241 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/politics/eu_referendum/results). The next step in the process was a par-
liamentary vote. For rhetorical purposes, consider that a member of parlia-
ment (MP) had wanted to vote on the basis of what is in the best interests of
the country. How should a public majority of 1.3 million be weighed against a
majority of 321 MPs? Is the layperson majority large enough to outweigh the
expert majority? In the current paper, we present a formal framework outlin-
ing how such a question can be answered and subsequently demonstrate
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that people are sensitive to the relevant factors identiﬁed for determining
how many lay opinions are required to counteract a single expert opinion.
Source-based appeals
The relationship between lay and expert opinions is surprisingly hidden in the
literature, partly because the concepts of expertise and lay consensus are fre-
quently considered separately. In argumentation research, for example, the
inﬂuence of lay opinions comes under the heading of “appeals from popular
opinion” (Godden, 2008; Walton, 1999; Wreen, 1993), whilst expert opinions
are considered as “appeals to expert opinion” (Walton, 1997). In the scheme-
based approach to argumentation, both are considered source-based argu-
ments (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008), and both, with a few exceptions
(e.g., Wreen, 1993), are seen as fallacious argument forms (Godden, 2008; Van
Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009; Walton et al., 2008). When the two argu-
ments are discussed together, the differences between the two types of argu-
ment are stressed (Walton, 1999, p. 56–60). What, then, are the characteristics
of these types of arguments?
The appeal to popular opinion – the “ad populum” argument – refers to
the general opinion of a large group of people, which is used to support the
truth or falsity of a hypothesis (Walton, 1999, p. 200):
Everybody (in a particular reference group, G) accepts A.
Therefore, A is true (or you should accept A).
Everybody (in a particular reference group, G) rejects A.
Therefore, A is false (or you should reject A).
In the scheme-based approach to argumentation, there is a unique
description of each type of argument, accompanied by so-called critical ques-
tions (CQs) which help to determine whether a given argument of this type is
presumptively valid. For the appeal to popular opinion, there are three CQs
(Table 1; Walton, 1989).
The appeal to expert opinion or the appeal to authority (for which there
are six question to evaluate it; see Table 1) refers to the opinion of a knowl-
edgeable person (Walton, 1997; Walton et al., 2008, p. 14):
Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A
E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false)
A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
As can be seen in Table 1, there is no overlap at all between the CQs associ-
ated with the appeal to popular opinion and those associated with the expert
opinion, suggesting that the two argument types are seen as completely sep-
arate on the scheme-based approach. Finally, Walton (1999, p. 224; see also
Walton et al., 2008) distinguishes a subtype of the appeal to popular opinion
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that combines the two: the “expert-opinion ad populum” argument. No CQs
are provided for this type of argument, making it difﬁcult to assess how this
type of argument is precisely positioned between the other types of argu-
ment. Should one, for example, use the CQs for the appeal to expert opinion
or popular opinion, or some (as yet unspeciﬁed) combination to evaluate the
following argument?
Everybody in this group G accepts A.
G is a group of experts in a domain of knowledge.
Therefore, A is true.
Appealing to the opinion of large groups, or to the opinion of an expert,
has attracted considerable research attention in social psychology (for a more
formal treatment, see e.g., Ladha, 1992). Studies on persuasion have investi-
gated how people’s attitudes and decisions can be affected by a source’s
expertise (for reviews see Pornpitakpan, 2004; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993) and by
appealing to majority opinions (e.g., Freling & Dacin, 2010; Maheswaran &
Chaiken, 1991). Unfortunately, these studies have not addressed the question
as to how the two types of sources relate to each other (for a rare study inter-
ested in public and expert opinion, see De Haan, Dijkstra, & Dijkstra, 2005).
Bayesian approach to source-based appeals
In epistemology, a broader perspective has been developed for the under-
standing of human testimony – whether it is for one testimony from an expert
source, or for a larger number of relatively inexpert testimonies. Bovens and
Hartmann (2003) present three dimensions that play a role in testimony: the
reliability of the information source (the perceived correspondence between
a source’s testimony and the true state of the world), coherence between
multiple sources (the degree to which their reports are consistent with one
another) and the degree of (in)dependence between multiple sources. A sim-
ple conceptualisation of the appeal to expert opinion and popular opinion
Table 1. Critical questions for the evaluation of the appeal to popular opinion and the
appeal to expert opinion.
Appeal to popular opinion
(Walton, 1989, p. 89)
Appeal to expert opinion
(Walton, 1997, p. 223)
Does a large majority of the cited reference group
accept A as true?
How credible is E as an expert source?
Is there other relevant evidence available that would
support the assumption that A is not true?
Is E an expert in the ﬁeld that A is in?
What reason is there for thinking that the view of
this large majority is likely to be right?
What did E assert that implies A?
Is E personally reliable as a source?
Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
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arguments is as two extremes on the same continuum. On the one extreme is
a case with a small number of sources with high expertise (argument from
expert opinion), and on the other extreme a case with a large number of sour-
ces with low expertise (argument from popular opinion).
A Bayesian conceptualisation enables qualitative and quantitative pre-
dictions of how convincing these (now quantitatively) different arguments
should be (see also e.g., Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Hahn, Harris, & Corner,
2009; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2016). Hahn et al. (2009), for example,
demonstrate that an argument providing more evidence should be more
convincing than one providing less (neither a novel nor surprising observa-
tion!) and that an argument from a reliable source should be more con-
vincing than one from an unreliable source (again, neither novel nor
surprising!). However, these elements (source reliability and amount of evi-
dence) also interact with one another, and na€ıve participants were shown
to be sensitive to this interaction in their evaluations of a message’s per-
suasiveness. Our formalisation of the appeals to expert and popular opin-
ion equates the opinion of a person with a piece of evidence.
Consequently, one would predict the same effects as observed in Hahn
et al., where the number of opinions substitutes for the number of pieces
of evidence.1 Note that, whereas the majority is what matters in the argu-
mentation-scheme perspective to the appeal to popular opinion, only the
number of group members is of importance in the Bayesian account (see
Hahn & Hornikx, 2016, for a discussion of group size).
Conceptualising the appeals to expert and popular opinion as above
allows us to answer the question of how to weigh the opinion of a large
group of people (e.g., 1.3 million UK citizens) versus an expert’s opinion (e.g.,
one speciﬁc MP). That is, taking one expert with a given level of expertise as a
starting point, it can be computed, within the Bayesian framework, how many
members in an argument from popular opinion of a certain low level of exper-
tise are needed to counterbalance that expert.
Bayes’ theorem as a normative standard for belief revision is shown below:
Pðh j eÞ ¼ PðhÞPðe j hÞ
PðhÞPðe j hÞ þ Pð: hÞPðe j : hÞ
We set up our experiment such that it can be assumed that participants
have no speciﬁc prior belief in the conclusion: P(h) = P(:h) = .50. If a ﬁrst testi-
mony is right in 60% of cases (accuracy = .60), P(ejh) can be set at .60. In our
predictions, we assume P(ejh) + P(ej:h) = 1. Although not prescribed
1There are more detailed Bayesian formalisations of the appeal to expert opinion (e.g., Harris et al., 2016)
and of the appeal to popular opinion (Korb, 2003), but the present simpliﬁed conceptualisations of the two
types of argument sufﬁce for our current purposes.
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mathematically, we see this as a natural interpretation of our experimental
text. Following the ﬁrst testimony, the posterior belief in the conclusion,
P(hje), equals .60. With a second group member with the same P(ejh), the new
P(h) now is the former P(hje) = .60. The updated P(hje) after two group mem-
bers equals .69. When adding new independent group members with the
same P(ejh), P(hje) will increase to asymptote approximately 1 (cf. Hahn et al.,
2009). Following this formalisation, as the accuracy level of a source increases,
fewer members will be required to reach the same level of belief in the claim.
Consequently, the number of laypeople required to counteract a single
expert will depend upon the expertise of the expert (more laypeople will be
required the more expert the expert) and the expertise of the laypeople
(fewer will be required the more expert they are). In the extreme, where lay-
people are as accurate as experts, the opinion of a single layperson counter-
acts the opinion of an expert (further demonstrating why the two argument
types might be most parsimoniously considered as on one continuum). Given
that, intuitively (and, arguably, by deﬁnition), laypeople will be less accurate
than experts, Figure 1 shows the effects of ﬁve different levels of lay accuracy
and ﬁve levels of expert source accuracy on the number of lay reports
required to counteract a single expert.
Figure 1 demonstrates an interaction between the two factors: with a
decrease in lay accuracy, the impact of expert accuracy more strongly affects
the predicted number of group members in a popular opinion. The present
study’s interest is in determining to what extent people’s assessments follow
these considerations:
RQ1 Do people assign a larger number of members in a popular opin-
ion to counter an expert opinion when the expertise of the expert
increases?
RQ2 Do people assign a smaller number of members in a popular opinion
to counter an expert opinion when the expertise of the members
increases?
RQ3 Do people’s assessments of the number of members in a popular
opinion reﬂect the Bayesian interaction between expert accuracy and
member accuracy?
Finally, Figure 1 demonstrates that precise quantitative predictions can be
obtained from the Bayesian formalisation (see also Harris, Hsu, & Madsen,
2012; Harris et al., 2016). Thus, our ﬁnal research question is:
RQ4 Are people’s assessments of the number of members in a popular
opinion needed to counter an expert opinion quantitatively in line
with Bayesian predictions?
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Method
Participants
About 146 Dutch people (age: M = 31.27, SD = 12.18, range 17–70; 54% male)
completed the study (4 participants from an original 150 were excluded hav-
ing correctly guessed the study’s purpose). Level of education ranged from
lower vocational education (10%) to MA degree (19%), the largest category
was BA graduates (37%).
Design
Participants received scenarios in which an appeal to expert opinion was
countered by an appeal to public opinion. Five levels of expert expertise were
0
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Figure 1. Predicted estimates of the number of lay reports required to counteract the
expert reports across conditions.
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crossed with ﬁve levels of layperson expertise using a Latin Square design (for
implementation of this design in argumentation research, see Corner & Hahn,
2009; Corner, Hahn, & Oaksford, 2011). Consequently, each participant
responded to ﬁve scenarios and each of the levels of expert expertise and lay-
person expertise, although the combinations of these were randomised
across participants (see Table 2).
Expertise of the experts and laypeople was manipulated through inform-
ing participants of the percentage of cases (similar to the present one) in
which the sources were correct (experts: 75%, 80%, 90%, 95% and 99.99%;
laypeople: 51%, 52.5%, 55%, 57.5% and 60%). Five different scenarios were
introduced, which always corresponded with the same expert expertise levels:
Transportation in a mid-sized city (99.99%), housing for students (75%), loiter-
ing (95%), car-free zones in city centres (80%) and wildlife crossing on
regional roads (90%). Participants always saw the scenarios in this order.
For each scenario, participants were asked to indicate (free numerical
response) how many laypeople they thought were required to counter the
opinion of the expert.
Materials and procedure
Participants were invited to take part in an online study, ostensibly concern-
ing municipal plans, run through Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Upon con-
senting to participate, they responded to the ﬁve scenarios. The scenarios
had the form of a dialogue between Person A, Person B and Person C
(inspired by previous materials in Bayesian argumentation research – e.g.,
Oaksford & Hahn, 2004). An example for the topic of car-free zones is:
Person A: Have you heard about the plan to make Nieuwstraat in Apeldoorn2 a
car-free zone, because they expect it to raise the number of customers in the
shopping street?
Table 2. Design of the study, and the laypeople’s accuracy for each scenario in the ﬁve
versions.
Expert’s accuracy
99.99% 95.00% 90.00% 80.00% 75.00%
Scenario Transportation in city Loitering Wildlife crossing Car-free zones Housing for students
Version
1 55% 51% 60% 52.5% 57.5%
2 60% 57.5% 52.5% 51% 55%
3 52.5% 55% 51% 57.5% 60%
4 51% 60% 57.5% 55% 52.5%
5 57.5% 52.5% 55% 60% 51%
2The cities in the scenarios were within 100 km. of where the study was conducted (Nijmegen, The
Netherlands).
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Person B: Yes, but why do you ask me that question?
Person A: Because I do not know whether it is a good plan or not.
Person B: I think it is.
Person A: Why?
Person B: A professor in retail marketing at Utrecht University has indicated that
this will help to increase the number of shop customers. And he is in a good
position to know because he is right in 80 percent of the cases about consumer
purchases.
(Person C hears the conversation between Person A and Person B, and now
rejects Person B’s statement.)
Person C: But I heard that road workers, who are working in the area, are telling
that this zone will not help in increasing the number of customers in the shops.
Road workers are not knowledgeable when it comes to consumer purchases. On
this topic each road worker is right in 52.5% of the cases. However, there is a
large number of road workers who have this opinion. How large would the
group of road workers have to be to outweigh the opinion of the professor in
retail marketing?
After the ﬁve scenarios, participants provided demographic information
and stated what they thought the goal of the study was.
Results
As a ﬁrst test, we wanted to determine whether participants’ estimates of the
number of laypeople required to counteract the expert opinions were qualita-
tively in line with the Bayesian predictions. Figure 2 demonstrates that, whilst
not perfect, the general pattern of results predicted in Figure 1 appears to be
observed.
Analyses conﬁrmed that participants were sensitive to the three predicted
factors. In relation to RQ1, participants indeed assigned a larger number of
members in a popular opinion when expert accuracy increased, F(4, 705) =
260.6, p < .001, etap
2 = 0.60. For RQ2, participants assigned a smaller number
of members when lay expertise increased, F(4, 705) = 315.1, p < .001, etap
2 =
0.64. For RQ3, participants’ assessments reﬂected the predicted interaction
between expert accuracy and member accuracy, F(16, 705) = 9.2, p < .001,
etap
2 = 0.17.3
In order to assess the quantitative ﬁt of the data to the Bayesian predic-
tions (RQ4), we correlated the mean responses with the Bayesian predictions
(Figure 3) across the combinations of lay and expert accuracy. People’s assess-
ments of the number of members in a popular opinion needed to counter an
3For the reported inferential statistics, the dependent variable was transformed such that each partici-
pant’s mean response = 0, and a factorial analysis of variance was performed on the resulting data
(Howell, 1997, p. 452). A regular repeated measures ANOVA was inappropriate as a result of the Latin
Squared design. Signiﬁcance levels were the same when untransformed data were analysed.
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expert opinion were approximately in line with Bayesian predictions, with
54% of variance in participants’ responses explained by the Bayesian predic-
tions, F(1, 23) = 28.93, p < .001, R2 = .54, b = .75. Close inspection of Figure 3
suggests that participants were least successful in following a Bayesian
account when the expert was said to have an extreme level of expertise
(99.99%; arguably an unrealistic scenario). In those cases, relatively large
0
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Figure 2. Mean estimates of the number of lay reports required to counteract the expert
reports across conditions. Error bars are plus and minus 1 standard error.
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Figure 3. Predicted and actual estimates of the number of lay reports required to coun-
teract the expert reports across conditions. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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numbers of members are predicted, and participants rarely provided esti-
mates greater than 50. If the scenarios with 99.99% of expert accuracy were
discarded in the analysis, the ﬁt between participants estimates and Bayesian
predictions increased to explain 91% of the variance, F(1, 18) = 191.61, p <
.001, R2 = .91, b = .96.
Discussion
Against the background of previous, relatively independent, treatments of lay
opinions and expert opinions, the present study examined an original ques-
tion as to whether people are capable of assessing how many lay opinions
are needed to counter an expert opinion. People were found to be fairly
good at assessing how many lay opinions are needed. Their assessments
were compared to predictions that followed a Bayesian formalisation of
source-based arguments (cf. Hahn et al., 2009). In line with this formalisation,
participants in the current study correctly assigned a larger number of mem-
bers when expert accuracy increased, and a smaller number of members
when lay expertise increased.
The present study employed several simplifying assumptions: the indepen-
dence of the laypeople; the infallibility of testimonies from Persons B and C;
rigidity in perceptions of the accuracy levels of the experts and the laypeople.
The likelihood of some dependency in the laypeople’s opinions suggests that
the Bayesian estimates might require revision upwards, though effects of
dependency are complex and, at times, unintuitive (e.g., Bovens & Hartmann,
2003; Ladha, 1992); the potential for some unreliability in the reports of Per-
son’s B and C could be modelled using Bayesian Networks (as in Hahn, Harris,
& Corner, 2016); receipt of a large number of reports all stating the same fact
might lead to a revision in one’s estimate of the accuracy of the laypeople
and the expert – so-called dynamic inference (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2013).
Furthermore, whilst Harris et al. (2016) demonstrated that people were differ-
entially sensitive to the trustworthiness/veracity of the expert and their exper-
tise/sensitivity (see also, e.g. Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 2012), the
current study combined these elements into a single reliability measure. Con-
sequently, there are a variety of avenues for future research to explore.
The present work adds to work on Bayesian argumentation (e.g., Bovens &
Hartmann, 2003; Hahn & Oaksford, 2006, 2007), highlighting that a Bayesian
perspective to argumentation can provide insights into how people reason
with arguments. The present study explicitly related expert opinions with lay
opinions. People were shown to be able to relate the two opinions to each
other, which suggests that – in line with the Bayesian account of source-
based arguments – the two types of arguments are more closely connected
than suggested by the scheme-based approach. This study may stimulate
research examining the connections and differences between various source-
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based arguments. The ﬁt between Bayesian predictions and participants’
assessment was extremely good with data excluding extreme expert accu-
racy, and fairly good with all ﬁve levels of expert accuracy. Systematic investi-
gation of the assumptions underlying this work may provide better insights
into how good people are in their assessments, where exactly they start to
underperform, and what may explain this underperformance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
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